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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new quantum bit commitment protocol which is prac-
tically secure against entanglement attacks. A general cheating strategy is discussed
and shown to be practically ineffective against the proposed approach.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography in the sense of key distribution was first introduced in [1] with the
BB84 protocol. The authors also proposed a bit commitment scheme which they determined
was not secure. Construction of an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment tech-
nique has since become an important research problem. There have been many commitment
schemes created, as well as a number of results on the impossibility of secure commitment
[2] [6] [7]. Even teleportation has been considered to achieve unconditional security [3].
Recently, “practically” secure commitment schemes [4] have been examined, rather than
asymptotically secure protocols.
Consider a two party (Alice and Bob) bit commitment. Alice chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1},
locks it and sends it to Bob (this is called the commitment phase). When it is time to
reveal b (opening phase), Bob locks the bit with his own lock (i.e., he locks the bit locked
by Alice), and sends it back to Alice. She then opens her lock and sends the bit back to
Bob and announces b. Bob then opens his lock and checks whether the locked bit b is the
same as the one which was announced.
Here we propose a simple scheme using the principles of the well-known Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol (details of this protocol can be found in [5]). However, we employ
multiplication by a unitary transform instead of exponentiation in a multiplicative group
modulo a prime. Although this commitment scheme also falls within the category for which
entanglement cheating is a proof of insecurity, (since it satisfies the criteria based on the
simplified Yao model [8] as described in [7]), it is practically very hard for Alice to cheat.
This is due to the fact that building the unitary transform required to apply on her share
of the entangled pair is practically infeasible, as will be shown.
Before presenting our bit-commitment protocol, we first define practical security. For
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this, we need the following.
Binding Experiment (BE)
• Alice and Bob share a system HA ⊗ HB and a protocol Π for which the final state
before the opening phase is ρAB ∈ HA ⊗HB
• A cheating Alice performs the operation A⊗ I[ρAB] and reveals b←R {0, 1} to Bob.
(A is a trace preserving operation)
• Bob then performs the operation (actually a measurement) I ⊗B[ρAB ] to obtain b
′.
• The outcome of the experiment is 1 (success) if b = b′ and 0 (fail) otherwise.
Definition 1.1 A protocol pi is computationally binding (CB) if for all polynomial time
quantum operations Alice can perform we have Pr[BEApi (1
n) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n), where
negl(n) is a negligible function of the secrecy parameter n.
Proposition 1.2 If a protocol is CB then there is no collection of circuits {Qx|x ∈ S}
(where S is any string) which can be generated in polynomial time that can approximate the
operation A.
Proof. The proof is obvious given the definition. 
Achieving CB security is a general task and Alice may employ different approaches in an
attempt to compromise the security of a protocol. One important case is an EPR attack
by Alice. EPR attacks [7] have been proven to make all quantum bit commitment schemes
theoretically insecure. Therefore we introduce the notion of EPR-Computationally Binding
(EPR-CB).
Definition 1.3 A protocol pi is EPR-Computationally Binding (EPR-CB) if for all poly-
nomial time quantum operations by Alice, we have Pr[BEApi (1
n) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n), where
negl(n) is a negligible function of the secrecy parameter n. Note that Alice is only capable of
entangling an ancillary system in the corresponding Hilbert space, and can perform unitary
transforms and POVM(Positive Operator Valued Measure) measurements on her part before
the opening phase.
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Proposition 1.4 CB is equivalent to EPR-CB if a cheating Alice can extend any system
to a larger system in polynomial time.
Proof. Obviously, any EPR-CB protocol is also CB. It is known that all trace preserving
quantum operations on a Hilbert space can be extended to a higher dimensional system in
which these operations can be reduced to a unitary transform. Therefore, a cheating Alice
can extend a system and then perform a unitary transform. A general CB experiment on a
Hilbert space Hn is equivalent to a (unitary and POVM)-CB experiment on a Hilbert space
Hm where m ≥ n. Therefore EPR-CB security is equivalent to CB security. 
Note that this proof is important as it connects the concept of binding to EPR security.
Definition 1.5 An ensemble of protocols Π = {pi1, · · · , pin} is computationally binding
(CB) if all pii ∈ Π are CB.
This definition is needed because if there is only one protocol for which the bit commitment
is CB, a cheating Alice can prepare the necessary circuit for changing the qubit in advance
and use it at the time of commitment.
2 The Proposed Bit Commitment Protocol
In this section, we present the proposed method of bit commitment. With this protocol,
each party prepares a secret unitary operator. It is assumed that a quantum channel as well
as a classical side-channel are available, as with other bit commitment schemes. The qubits
are exchanged through the quantum channel, while the side-channel is used to exchange
the secret unitary operators in the opening phase. The proposal can then be described as
follows.
• Commitment Phase:
– Bob prepares two previously agreed upon orthogonal states |φ0〉, |φ1〉, and applies
his secret transform UB on them. He sends these to Alice and tells her which to
use if she wants to commit 0 or 1.
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– Alice prepares UA·UB |φ0〉 or UA·UB |φ1〉 and sends |φ〉 ∈ {UA·UB |φ0〉, UA·UB |φ1〉}
back to Bob depending on the bit she wants to share.
• Opening Phase:
– Alice reveals her unitary transform UA to Bob through the classical channel.
– Bob computes |ψ〉 = UB ·UA|φ〉 and checks if it agrees with the committed qubit.
Note that the secret unitary transforms can be chosen at random from a continuous subset
of the unitary group. As an example, we can assume that |φ0〉 = |0〉 and |φ1〉 = |1〉, and
UA, UB ∈ {Rx(θ), Ry(θ), Rz(θ)} where Rx(θ) is a rotation about the x axis with an angle θ.
3 Security and Cheating Strategies
One approach for Alice to attempt to cheat is to apply a unitary transform UA during
the committing phase but then send V · UA during the opening phase (where V is another
unitary transform), such that when Bob tries to open the commitment he receives a bit
other than the one which was committed (say Alice has committed |φ0〉 but now wants Bob
to open |φ1〉). For Alice to be successful in cheating, the following must be true for the last
step of the opening phase
|ψ〉 = UB · V · UA · UA.UB |φ0〉 = |φ1〉 ⇒ UB · V · UB = |φ1〉〈φ0|
This shows that Alice can construct such a transform V only if she knows the secret trans-
form of Bob. By a similar analysis, Bob also cannot determine the state |φi〉 if he knows
UA · UB|φi〉.
3.1 Practical security against an EPR (entanglement) attack
Let |A〉 and |B〉 denote the uniform superposition of all possible UA and UB on |φi〉. In
other words, assuming UA and UB are controlled gates and |A〉 and |B〉 the corresponding
control registers, we have a register (|A〉 or |B〉) which is a superposition of all possible
choices of the unitary transformations by Alice and Bob. Considering these registers at the
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end of the commitment phase, we have
|ψ0〉 =
∑
A
∑
B |B〉UAUB|φ0〉 ⊗ UAUB |φ1〉|A〉
|ψ1〉 =
∑
A
∑
B |B〉UAUB|φ1〉 ⊗ UAUB |φ0〉|A〉,
where |ψ0〉 denotes 0 and |ψ1〉 denotes 1. In each state, the component on the right side of
the tensor product is possessed by Alice. Now, if the protocol is secure against Bob then
the local trace over the system components of Alice must be equal for both |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉.
As a result, regarding the Schmidt decomposition we have a unitary transform V on Alice’s
side which can take values from |ψ0〉 to |ψ1〉. In order for Alice to produce V , she must
know all possible choices for UB (but she does not need to know a particular choice of UB).
The existence of V shows that the protocol is not theoretically secure, but the two parties
can hide their sets of unitary transforms and make the protocol practically secure against
an entanglement attack.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a simple but secure bit commitment protocol which is based on
the application of secret unitary transforms by each party (Alice and Bob) in succession.
Cheating strategies, including entanglement cheating, were examined and the system was
shown to be effective against these attacks.
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